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STEVE

ZIMMERMAN

certifies that
purposes

of

through
this

delay,

his

petition
but

is

occurred or points have been
reconsideration of

legal
for
based

counsel,

rehearing
on

overlooked

is

BRUCE
not

WILSON,
made for

belief that errors have
and

that

rehearing or

these points is needed to avoid injustice and

to clarify the law as decided in this case.
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ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS

1.

The

first

Issue

Is

WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT HOLDING IN

STREATOR CHEVROLET RESTRICTS THE STATUTORY WORD "INCAPACITY" TO A
NARROWER, INCLUDED

MEANING OF

"IMPAIRMENT" OR WHETHER THE COURT

MERELY SUBSTITUTED

"IMPAIRMENT" IN

PLACE OF

THE STATUTORY WORD

"INCAPACITY" BECAUSE IT CONVENIENTLY APPLIED TO THE FACTS IN THAT
CASE.
On page six of
Supreme Court

Its opinion,

has found

section 35-1-69(1)

this Court

Indicated that the

that the term "aggravation," as used In

requires industrially

caused "Impairment" as

pre-condition for receiving compensation and, for support of this
rule, cites Second Injury Fund

v

Streator

Chevrolet,

709 P.2d

1176, 1181 (Utah 1985).
The Court
fact that

fails to

the statute

address the question or account for the

mandates compensation

if an "Incapacity"

caused by industrial Injury aggravates or is aggravated by a preexisting "incapacity."
It is axiomatic that Utah law

distinguishes "impairment" of

bodily function from "disability" to perform occupational duties.
In Section 35-1-69(1) the Legislature used the word "incapacity,"
a more

general term

that by

common definition encompasses both

impairment and disability.
Finding that the holding

of the

Supreme Court

in Streator

Chevrolet restricts the statutory word "incapacity" to the narrow
meaning of "impairment" is not

justified.
2

The

Streator Court

acknowledges ambiguity
ments of

in the

the "aggravation"

statute relating

language, but it declines to address

that issue because in the

Streator

industrial

impairment.

Consequently,

difference

in

Streator

to the require-

whether

case

there
it

was substantial

would

"incapacity"

have made no

was

limited

to

"impairment1 or read broadly to include "disability" as well.
Thus, in stating its holding, the Court substituted the word
"impairment" in place of the statutory "incapacity."
indication

that

in

maklnu

that,

There is no

substitution they intended to

exclude the concept of "disability" from the statutory meaning of
"incapacity,ff

There was

issue was n>t before
"impairment"

were

used

Chevrolet opinion.
the holding

the

no discussion

on that issue, and that

Court.

words

The

"incapacity" and

Interchangeably throughout the Streator

The use of

"impairment" as

a requirement in

of Streator Chevrolet appears to be a consequence of

the fact that impairment was in issue in that case.
manifest

any

intent

by

the

Supreme

Cour t

statutory language so as to limit the clear
"incapacity"

in

a

way

that

to

It

does not

interpret the

meaning of

the word

would preclude "disability" as an

appropriate alternative mean i ng o f t he wor d " I neapac i fy "
Consequently, the holding of

Streator

Chevrolet

should be

read
"If the industrial injury results in a permanent
incapacity that is aggravated by or aggravates a preexisting incapacity, then compensation shall be awarded..."
That statement of the holding follows the statutory language
more closely,

and nothing

in Streator indicates an intent to do
3

other than follow the plain meaning of that language.
Thus, as

applied to

Mr. Zimmerman,

the Streator Chevrolet

interpretation of the statute says
"If the
Industrial injury
results in incapacity
(disability) which aggravates (increases or adds to) a preexisting incapacity (20% impairment), then compensation ...
shall be awarded..."

2.

The second issue is WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL, OR REASON-

ABLY

FOUNDED

FINDING THAT

EVIDENCE

TO

SUPPORT

MR. ZIMMERMAN'S

OCCUPATION WAS CAUSED BY

THE

INDUSTRIAL

INABILITY TO

HIS PRE-EXISTING

COMMISSION

RETURN TO HIS FORMER
CONDITIONS." (Medical

Panel finding #2)
While it

may be decided that the aggravation referred to by

the medical panel was that due solely to temporary pain,

that is

not the only aggravation in question.
It

is

undisputed

fact

adopted

by the ALJ and Industrial

Commission that Mr. Zimmerman worked six

years without complaint

despite

It is further agreed by

his

pre-existing

impairment.

virtually every examining doctor,
that Mr.

Zimmerman is

former occupation.

including

the

medical panel,

now medically incapable of continuing his

(For references in

the Record,

see p.

3 #1

and p. 4 #6 of Appellant's Brief.)
To say that Mr. Zimmerman's disability is caused by his preexisting conditions cannot stand
it is
the

up to

rational scrutiny, since

undisputed that he worked six years without complaint with
20%

impairment

and

only

became

industrial injury.
4

disabled

following

the

This

court

Commission only

has the power
if they

to affirm

are "supported

findings

of the

by substantial evidence

when viewed in light of the who] e record before the court." Grace
Drilling, 776 P.2d at 67.

IN SUMMARY:

If

the rule

in Streator Chevrolet says t .he ii ldus-

trlal Injury must result in an "impairment," Mr. Zimmerman has no
But if the statutory word Hincapacity'1 is

claim for aggravation.
the operative
his

former

word

thei i Mr. Zimmerman's

occupation

constitutes

an

inability to continue
aggravation of his pre-

existing impairment, and he is entitled to benefits.

WHEREFORE, Mr. Zimmerman prays for reconsideration

and reversal.

He requests the following findings:
1.

That

the

only reasonable conclusion supported by the

uncontradicted evidence is that,
injury,

Mr.

Zimmerman

is

as a

result of

the industrial

incapable of" returning to his tonner

occupation.
2.
in that

That he met the statutory requirements
his industrial ly

caused Incapacity

for compensation

aggravated his pre-

existing impairments.
3.

That he is

doctrine, for
ment of showing

consequently

eligible,

under

the

odd lot

rehabilitation evaluat ioi i, ha^ < ing met the requi rehe

cannot

perform

occupation.

5

the

duties

of

his former

£fk

Dated this t>!H

day of December, 1989.

BRUCE J- WILSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
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